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What did the framers of the Constitution intend when they included the
General Welfare Clause in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution? Many people cite .
that clause as legal justification for America's ever-expanding federal entitlement
spending. To the contrary, James Madison made clear in his writings that he did not
think any language in the Constitution, which he helped frame, authorized
unrestrained growth in a central governrnent.
During the years since Madison explained the intent behind the General
Welfare Clause, proponents of the welfare state have either ignored or rejected his
insistence that the Constitution stands as a guarantee against an over powerful federal
governrnent. Instead, many now claim that the Constitution is a "living document"
that supports the growth of a centralized power.
A growing percentage of the American people have adopted this fundamental
shift away from the perception that the Constitution limits the role of the federal
governrnent. This burgeoning segment of the population has embraced a mindset in
which the governrnent functions, not only to protect but also to provide property
rights by means of entitlement programs. Many Americans have come to expect the

federal government to ensure that their pursuits of happiness, or even their lack of
effort, will result in a base line of positive outcomes.
While many Americans believe welfare initiatives are programs designed to
move families out of povert y, such is not the case. lf the surge of federal welfare
initiatives that have been introduced since the I 930's had been designed to end
poverty, the nation sho uld have experienced declining poverty rates and then
declining bureaucratic budgets required to combat the weakened enemy of financ ial
hardship . Instead, analysts predict that. unless entitlement programs are refom1ed or
eliminated, federal welfare spending could consume nearly half of the nation's G DP
within the next half century.
T his paper wi ll a.) analyze the original intent of the General Welfare C lause of
the Constitution, b.) trace the evolution of Constitutional construction away from that
original intent, and c.) exan1ine the federal entitlement programs that sprang from a
liberal interpretation o f the clause, and d.) prescribe changes to improve the
sustainability of the federal welfare system. In light of this exploration, the legitimacy
of the fo llowing proposition will emerge: Altho ugh many call for a fundamental
change in American society aimed towards the improvement in our entitlement
initiatives, w hat is needed, instead is a change back to the fundamental principals of
the A merican founding.
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Introduction
The most radical and world changing propositions among those embedded in
founding documents of the United States were the values of personal freedom and
economic liberty. "The novelty of the undertaking immediately strikes us" (Hamilton,
et al 2003). This assertion, made by James Madison in Federalist Paper No. 37
concerning the proposed adoption of the United States Constitution, proved to be an
understatement. With remarkable clarity, the founders foresaw the positive results
that would flow from the innovative document they adopted.

An in-depth exploration of these theoretical underpinnings of the United
States reveals that brilliant thinkers, who had the prescience to adopt these unproven
and somewhat counterintuitive ideals, were responsible for founding a nation that has ·
produced the highest standard of living for the most people in the history of the
world. Incremental deviations from these founding principles in recent decades,
however, have produced an economic system that is more centrally managed than
was originally intended and that threatens the fiscal future of the nation.
Standing on the shoulders of the philisophical giants John Locke and Adam
Smith, the founders of the United States determined that the appropriate role of
government was to establish institutions that protect the rights of individuals in their
lives, liberty and property. The founders' philosophy of government combined
principles of classical liberalism and capitalism, which suggest that all members of
society will prosper when individuals are inspired to innovate, work hard, and
exercise morality. America's founding fathers believed people must be allowed to
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"rise and sink" economically based on their own industry. Although America has
maintained a degree of this archetype throughout its history, modern political leaders
increasingly respond to the financial challenges citizens face by insisting on federal
government intervention. Through regulation and taxation, the federal government
now seeks to redistribute and equalize wealth via entitlement programs.
Many people maintain that the Constitution provides justification for
entitlement spending in the General Welfare Clause of Article I, Section 8. Although
many modern scholars and politicians have interpreted the General Welfare Clause to
authorize broad grants of power not otherwise enumerated in the Constitution, the
father of the document, James Madison, made clear that he intended for the
Constitution to establish and maintain a federal government with limited powers.
Madison maintained that the General Welfare Clause was never meant to grant
additional powers to the federal government, and that it was included merely as an
introduction to the enumerated powers concerning the common defense and the
general welfare (Bugler 1994).
During the years since Madison explained the intent behind the General
Welfare Clause, however, many people have either ignored or rejected his insistence
that the Constitution stands as a guarantee against an ever-expanding federal
government. Instead, many now claim that the Constitution is a "living document"
that supports the growth of a centralized power. Those who support this line of
thinking have replaced Madison's narrow interpretation of the General Welfare
Clause with a liberal reading that grants the federal government the ability to do most
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anything it deems necessary to equalize outcomes in the lives of every American.
A growing percentage of the American people have adopted this fundamental
shift away from the perception that the Constitution limits the role of the federal
government. This segment of the population embraces a mindset in which the
government functions, not only to protect but also to provide property rights by
means of entitlement programs. These people have come to expect that the federal
government will go well beyond protecting their right to pursue happiness however
they choose; they now believe that Washington will ensure that a base line of positive
outcomes will result from their pursuits or even from their lack of effort.
For this reason, the United States is losing the distinction of being "The Land
of Opportunity," where the poor have reasons to hope they can rise economically
based on their efforts to achieve and the rich have incentives to imagine what they
still might gain and what they might lose if they fail to be industrious. Without hope
of betterment through effort and fear ofloss through indolence, the fundamental
character of this nation's populous is changed from that of its founding, and the
"American dream" is lost.
Federal welfare programs do not provide this type of hope or fear. While
many Americans believe welfare initiatives are programs designed to move families
out of poverty, such is not the case. It is more accurate to assert that the majority of
welfare initiatives are designed to do nothing more than create a politically acceptable
standard ofliving for the poor (Garkovich 1997).
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Despite widespread agreement that the various entitlement programs are
flawed in many regards, each of the stakeholders in these programs garner the
political strength n\:cessary to sustain the antipoverty framework as a mainstay in
American social policy (Germany). If the surge of federal welfare initiatives that
have been introduced since the 1930's had been successful, the nation should have
experienced declining poverty rates and then declining bureaucratic budgets required
to combat the weakened enemy of financial hardship. Instead, analysts predict that,
unless entitlement programs are reformed or eliminated, federal welfare spending
could consume nearly half of the nation's GDP by 2055
(http://www.heritage.org/budgetchartbook/entitlements-consume-economy).
This paper will a.) analyze the original intent of the General Welfare Clause of
the Constitution, b.) trace the evolution of Constitutional construction away from that
original intent, c.) examine the federal entitlement programs that sprang from a liberal
interpretation of the clause, and d.) prescribe changes to improve the sustainability of
the federal welfare system. In light of this exploration, the legitimacy of the following
proposition will emerge: Although many people call for the expansion of federal
entitlement programs, the welfare state is incompatible with the fundamental
principles of America's founding.

Founding American Principles
The federal government has grown so large that its modem framework bears
little resemblance to the limited form it took at the time of the nation's founding. A
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review of the original intent of American government is, therefore, required to reveal
that the welfare state is antithetical to their ideal government and to expose that
modem entitlement programs are incompatible with the fundamental principals of
personal freedom and economic liberty.
The founders spent a great deal of time exploring the fundamental reason that
men form civil government. Moreover, they carefully considered all possible
ramifications of the various political philosophies they studied because they
understood the profound nature of what they set out to accomplish. In The Federalist

Papers No. 1, Alexander Hamilton wrote: "It had been ... reserved for this
country ... to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really
capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice or whether
they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and
force" (Hamilton, et al 2003). Although the final product that emerged as the
Constitution was an amalgam of political philosophies, and although the ideas
contained in the documents set forth at the time of the founding contained seemingly
counterintuitive notions, the outcome was an affirmative answer to Hamilton's
question.
In order to establish a government that was sufficiently powerful to maintain a .
vast territory while, at the same time, adequately unrestrictive to maximize the rights
of citizens, the founders were forced to find an appropriate balance between
government authority and personal freedom. A resolution to this tension was of
utmost importance to the founders because they recognized that the security of
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individual rights should be the primary purpose of government. Drawing wisdom
from the philosophies of John Locke's view that men are born equal and independent
(Bloom 1992), the founders of the United States Constitution agreed that the primary
reason men form social contracts is to preserve their property, life, and liberty. While
Locke theorized that individuals are free to pursue these goals without the
intervention of government, he recognized that the formation of social contracts
lessens the threat posed by men who might seek to deprive others of their property,
life, and liberty (Locke 1980). In accepting Locke's view of why men consent to be
governed, the framers recognized that men relinquish some of their individual
freedoms in hopes of eliminating their fears and ensuring the mutual preservation of
their lives, liberties, and estates. Modem politicians have been successful in
convincing a large portion of American voters that it is the government's role not only
to preserve these ideals but also to provide them in situations where individuals are
unwilling or unable to do so themselves.
The framers of the United States Constitution, on the other hand, understood
that legitimate government is twice limited: First by its ends, to secure our rights; and
second by its means, the consent of the people (Samples 2002). Most importantly, the
founders realized that government is not the source of the people's rights. Because
they studied and accepted Locke's assertion that rights are granted uniformly to all
people by the Creator, they maintained that no government order could supersede
them (Bloom 1992). The founders recognized that the same government established
to protect rights had the potential also to do one of two things: (I) Institute laws to
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hinder the individual's enjoyment of God-given rights or (2) Institute policies that
promote the idea that individual rights come from government rather than the Creator.
They knew that if the latter happened, people would come to rely on the government
to provide services outside the scope of its Constitutional authority.
A review of the writings and political actions of James Madison, the father of
the Constitution, reveals that either of these actions would be an abuse of the powers
granted through the document. As evidenced by his academic endeavors, his
published and personal writings, and his political activities, Madison foresaw that a
liberal interpretation of the General Welfare Clause is incompatible with the system
oflimited government established by the Constitution.

A great deal of insight as to why Madison would consider this perspective to
be erroneous can be gained by studying his writings in The Federalist Papers. In an
effort to convince New York to vote for ratification of the Constitution, Alexander
Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison published this series of editorials in the New
York Independent Journal from October 1787 to April 1789 (Belt). He wrote many

of these papers to extol the benefits of the new system of government created by the
Constitution. Although this document set up a stronger national government than that
created by the Articles of Confederation, Madison is remembered as an ardent
supporter oflimited government.

The truth of this apparent ambiguity is that, at the time the Constitution and
The Federalist Papers were composed, Madison saw the republican form of
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government as the only safeguard from the factitious and capricious nature of the
constituents. Moreover, the divided sovereignty of state and federal governments,
which Madison outlines in Federalist 39, served to challenge inappropriate growth of
either level. He writes that, "In its foundation, it is federal, not national; in the
sources from which the ordinary powers of government are drawn, it is partly federal
and partly national; and, finally in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments,
it is nether wholly federal nor wholly national" (Hamilton et. al 2003).
In Federalist 44, 45, 46, and 51, he goes on to explain the specific roles of
both the state and federal governments and he explains that institutional mechanisms
put in place by the Constitution which ensures that authority at each level is checked.
Importantly, in Federalist 45, Madison assured the skeptical Anti-Federalists that the
Constitution would only give the central government powers that were "few and
defined" while those granted to the state governments were "numerous and infinite."
The state government could serve as a partner to execute federal legislation, but the
federal government would not execute state policies. In this way, the government
would be charged with the duty to control the governed as well as to control itself
(Hamilton et. al 2003).
Also in the Federalist Paper, Madison submitted an assertion that the
Constitutional system would provide insitutions capable of alleviating the problems
caused by factions in society in Federalist I 0. In his discourse, Madison first explores·
the causes of the malady: there was abundant diversity in the new nation at the time
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of its founding. This heterogeneity, Madison knew, would invariably result in
competing religious, moral, political, and cultural attachements. Furthermore,
Madison recognized that these passions would always be unequally supported by
citizens and that the pursuit of happiness for some would inherently run contrary to
the rights and happiness of others. (Hamilton, et al 2003).
Once again revealing the influence that John Locke's theories had on the
design of the American governmental system, Madison identifies the most significant
cause of faction as economic inequlity (Hamilton, et al 2003). Although, as explained
previously, Locke's paradigm was revolutionary in that it recognized men as equally
endowed with rights in the state of nature, he explained how the freedom to express
talents and qualities would inevitably divide into classes, sects, and parties or, in
Madison's terms, factions. Because justice in Locke's world view allowed for men to
accumulate as much as they contributed their labor towards, and because reaonsable
men would toil in varying degrees depending on their desire for profits, an unqual
distribution of outcome would naturally arise. Moreover, Locke explained that the
coinage of money defied the natural restraint of spoilage. By agreeing to its use, men
tacitly agree to economic inequality (Locke 1980).
Because the founding fathers and Locke agreed that the differences in
economic well being were the primary cause of social unrest and faction, they shared
the opinion that the fundamental purposes of government are to liberate and maintain
the market and to secure the property rights of individuals. Madison explores the two ·
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alternatives to curing the cause of these divisions in socity: Either the public
institutions should be organized in such a way as to remove the causes of differences
in society or those institutions sould aim to control the results that arise from these
differences. Further dissecting the possible remedys for faction, Madison explains
that there are two means by which the governmenet can remove the causes of faction:
The governmental system may destroy individual liberty, which, in the opinion of the
author, is a remedy worse than the disease, or the govenrment may employ various
schemes to instill the same opinions, and passions into each citizen. This is not only
impractical but runs counter to the founder's vision for the fundamental purpose of
government, that is, to secure the rights and liberty of the people (Hamilton, et al
2003). While Madison found neither of these options to be an ideal soultion to the
problem of faction in a community, it seems that an equalization of economic welfare
has become a much more tolerable notion to modern Americans.
The founders agreed with Locke that the common good to which the
government should direct society is justice and fairness for rational and industrious
men (Bloom 1992). These maxims outlined by Locke a century before the American
founding were reinforced by an economic philosophy that emerged just a decade prior
to the Constitutional debates. Published in 1776, Adam Smith's Wealth ofNations
introduced the concept of "economic individualism," which later became known as
the economic system of capitalism (Hessen). Echoing Locke's notions of individual
liberty and productivity, Smith presented a "system of natural liberty" in which
"every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to
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pursue his own interests his own way and to bring both his industry and capital into
competition with those of other men" (Ebeling 1990). The founders rejected, in turn,
the notion that the government should provide a guarantee of positive outcomes from
these pursuits.
Just as Madison considered what would be required to remove faction in a
general sense, Alexis de Tocqueville, an observer of American culture, studied the
social scene of the United States in his work Democracy in America and commented
on the culture that would likely develop if an equality of outcome had been chosen as
the end of American government. He theorized that "[t]he evils which extreme
equality may produce are slowly disclosed; they creep gradually into the social frame;
they are seen only at intervals; and at the moment at which they became most violent,
habit already causes them no longer to be felt" (Tocqueville 1956). The evil he
describes that is produced by economic equality is the loss of motivation to better
one's condition. The founders of the United States knew, largely due to their studies
of the philosophies of John Locke and Adam Smith, that social inequality had the
potential to produce greater prosperity.
The founders agreed with Smith's assertion that, when the actions of selfinterested men are aggregated, with each working towards the achievement of
individual goals, society as a whole achieves the common good (Friedman 1980).
Importantly, in addition to being well acquainted with Smith's The Wealth ofNations,
it is probably that the founders were well read with respect to Smith's lesser-known
work, Theory ofMoral Sentiments. In this text, the "father of economics" sets forth
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the theory that man's desire to help others stems, in part, from the motivation of selfinterest. Specifically, Smith asserts, "How selfish soever man may be supposed, there.
are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of
others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it
except the pleasure of seeing it" (Smith 1759).
With great craftsmanship and remarkable prudence the founding fathers were
able to design a governmental system that combined the philosophies economic
liberty as well as concern for the least in society. To refer again to Madison's
comments regarding human nature in Federalist Paper No. 56, he concedes that,
"... there are other qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem
and confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities
in a higher degree than any other form" (Hamilton, et al 2003). In simple terms,
Madison says that while the nation is built on liberty, and allows for the pursuit of
self-interest, the success of the nation depends on the selflessness citizens as well.
Relaying Madison's thoughts to the choice made by the founding fathers to institute
an economic system primarily driven by individual liberty or by governmental
intervention, scholars must admire the cunning of these men who were able to stand
confident in their decision to institute a limited government and to rely on the
interplay between selfishness and self-sacrifice that reconciles capitalist economies
with the need to care for the less fortunate in society as well.
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James Madison and the General Welfare Clause
Because the founders' intent was that competition, entrepreneurship, and
industriousness would drive American commerce and that moral men in society
would provide assistance to those who experience hardship, it was both unnecessary
and undesirable for the government to centrally manage the economy. In modern-day
America, however, politicians have interpreted the General Welfare Clause, which
can be found in Article 1, Section 8 and the Preamble to the Constitution, in such a
way that it expands the role of the federal government and enables it to tax and spend ·
for the purpose of directing economic affairs towards a more equitable outcome than
that which might result from a purely laissez faire economy.
Because Madison was among the most admired of his contemporaries for his
ability to anticipate contingencies and to understand long-range implications of the
government system he helped erect (Felzenberg 2001), his views concerning the
meaning of the General Welfare Clause are particularly important. Madison often
noted that the General Welfare Clause must be understood in its proper context before
the true meaning of the Constitution can be grasped (Sorenson 1992). He observed
that the relationship between this clause and the enumerated powers of the federal
government is one of the most important and fundamental concepts underlying the
American republic. He answered all questions regarding the effect of the General
Welfare Clause by explaining that it is a "synonym" for the enumeration of few and
defined powers, not a substantive grant of power beyond those listed (Sorenson
1992). Moreover, he explained that, if the latter interpretation of the clause was
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correct, the enumeration of specific powers in a subsequent section of the same
document would be superfluous (Grossman 2009).
If, as the father of the Constitution, Madison intended to grant vast authority
to the federal government towards the achievement of the general welfare of each
person living in America, it is doubtful that he would have taken such care to
differentiate between the infinitive phrases used in the Preamble to the Constitution,
which explains the purpose for and aim of that document: "to provide for the common
defense" versus "to promote the general welfare." Madison recognized that the federal
government should be commissioned with the responsibility of protecting and
defending citizens, but the phrasing of the Preamble's General Welfare Clause
indicates that he believed the federal government should simply encourage or help
create an atmosphere where citizens can secure their own general welfare. The
careful wording of the Preamble helps illuminate every other provision of the
Constitution.
It is necessary, therefore, to read the Taxing and Spending Clause of Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution in light of the Preamble. Specifically, the grant of
authority to tax and spend reads as follows:
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties,
Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.
(Emphasis added. Constitution of the United States 1787)

In reliance upon this enumerated power, some argue that the founders intended to
grant the federal government more power than the Preamble provides. Such an
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interpretation fails properly to take into consideration the prepositional phrase, "of the
United States," that follows the infinitive phrase "provide the general welfare. " That
prepositional phrase prohibits the grant of power from being expanded beyond taxing
and spending to provide for the general welfare of the union of states that make up the
United States. The Taxing and Spending Clause was never meant to charge Congress
with the obligation of providing for the welfare of each person living within the
borders of this nation; instead, the prepositional phrase "of the United States" makes
clear that Congress was charged with the obligation of providing for the welfare of
the nation as a whole.
Those who argue that the Taxing and Spending Clause allows Congress to
take money from some individuals and then redistribute it to others whose general
welfare is in jeopardy also fail to account for the final sentence of the Clause: "[B]ut
all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." Any
confusion about whether the Taxing and Spending Clause provides authority for the
modem welfare state is put to rest by this requirement that all taxes must be uniform.
Thus, to use the Taxing and Spending Clause as justification for the government's
provision of a baseline standard of living for every person within the borders of the
United States incorrectly allows the government to tax and spend in the interest of
certain groups of people as opposed to others, or as opposed to the nation as a whole.
Madison was clear that the General Welfare Clause should not be cited as
grounds for passing laws that otherwise have no Constitutional authority. He
insisted, instead, that the validation of legislation should be through "a definite
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connection between means and ends" in which the means and ends are linked "by
some obvious and precise affinity" (Lawson 2009). The text of Federalist 41 sets
forth Madison's argument that the General Welfare Clause was not meant to broaden
the powers specifically enumerated:
It has been urged and echoed, that the power "to lay and
collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the
debts and provide for the common defense and general
welfare of the United States," amounts to an unlimited
commission to exercise every power which may be
alleged to be necessary for the common defense or
general welfare. No stronger proof could be given of
the distress under which these writers labor for
objections, than their stooping to such a
misconstruction ... what colour can the objection have,
when a specification of the objects alluded to by these
general terms, immediately follows; and is not even
separated by a longer pause than a semicolon. If the
different parts of the same instrument ought to be so
expounded as to give meaning to every part which will
bear it; shall one part of the same sentence be excluded
altogether from a share in the meaning; and shall the
more doubtful and indefinite terms be retained in their
full extent and the clear and precise expressions, be
denied any signification whatsoever? For what purpose
could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted,
if these and all others were meant to be included in the
preceding general power? ... the idea of an enumeration
of particulars, which neither explain nor qualify the
general meaning, and can have no other effect than to
confound and mislead, is an absurdity ... (Rossiter
1999).
By this public defense of his position, Madison makes clear that the General
Welfare Clause in Article I, Section 8, was intended to describe one of the three
reasons the federal government can exercise its enumerated powers. That clause was
never meant to authorize new powers not otherwise enumerated, but it was included
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merely as an introduction to the enumerated powers granted concerning the common
defense and the general welfare (Bugler 1994).
Essentially Madison wished to limit the ends to which the federal government
could act, but not the means it could use to achieve those ends. He knew that, in the
ever-changing American society, new and better means of achieving the ends of
government would arise. In writing the Constitution, Madison took care to authorize
only the powers necessary for accomplishing the survival of the union. Because it is
evident that he ardently opposed the establishment of anything short of a limited
government, it would be contradictory to assert that any clause in the Constitution
grants broad powers other than those enumerated. Instead, any clause not in the
enumerated powers should be interpreted to grant a means of promoting an authorized
end. This validity of this rule for interpreting the Constitution is evidenced by
Madison's choice of the preposition in the Necessary and Proper Clause at the end of .
Article I, Section 8:
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying

into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof (Constitution of the United States
1787)
The use of the word "proper" in the Necessary and Proper Clause also
supports Madison's contention that the Constitution should be read as limiting the
powers of the federal government. The requirement that laws for executing federal
power must be "proper" provides a shorthand way of saying that they must stay
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within the jurisdictional boundaries established by the Constitutional structure of
federalism, separated powers, and reserved rights (Lawson 2009).
Despite his careful use oflanguage in the Constitution to restrain the federal
government, some scholars and politicians contend that Madison publicly supported
limited government yet privately believed that the General Welfare Clause delegates
to Congress plenary legislative power. These same people also contend that Madison
believed that the enumeration of specific powers served simply to allocate and assign
governmental functions (Sorenson 1992). These opinions hold little weight in view
of Madison's personal letters written during his time as a United States
Representative.
For example, in a letter dated January 21, 1792, Madison wrote to Edmund
Pendleton, "If Congress can do whatever in their discretion can be done by money,
and will promote the General Welfare, the Government is no longer a limited one,
possessing enumerated powers, but an indefinite one, subject to particular exceptions" .
(Heritage Foundation Quotes Database). Similarly, in a letter to Henry Lee the same
year, Madison explained that "[i]fnot only the means but the objects are unlimited,
the parchment [the Constitution] should be thrown into the fire at once" (Bugler

'
1994).
Upon ratification of the United States Constitution and institution of the three
braches of political power, Madison became a leader in the United States House of
Representatives, serving from 1789 through 1797. During that time, the First
Congress introduced and passed eleven amendments to the Constitution, ten of which
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became the Bill of Rights (Bradford 1982, 150). Although the Anti-Federalist party
drove the push for a Bill of Rights, Madison, who was beginning to butt heads with
Hamilton, was cooperative and even proposed a number of the amendments. His
position was, however, that when a government is limited by enumerated powers, a
bill of rights is somewhat unnecessary and even potentially dangerous to liberty.
In deinonstrating his commitment to reading the Constitution as a strict
delegation of enumerated powers, Madison expressed his fear that partial
enumeration would forfeit by implication un-enumerated rights (Kearnes). To
cooperate with the Anti-Federalists, however, Madison proposed the addition of two
clarifying statements, which later became the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
Both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were less a statement about rights than
they were an affirmation about the nature of the Constitution, federalism, and a
paradigm for interpreting the Constitution. The Ninth Amendment reads: "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people" (Kearnes). This statement was added to the
Bill of Rights at Madison's insistence because he understood that the enumeration of
federal powers was intended to limit the public provision of services to only those
specifically listed.
In drafting the Bill of Rights, the Founding Fathers did not want to cause
anyone to think that individuals lost any right not specifically enumerated. While
Madison intended to limit the powers of the federal government to those specifically
enumerated, he did not intend to limit individual rights to those listed in the Bill of
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Rights. Madison knew, therefore, that it was imperative to distinguish between his
intent in each section of the Constitution. Accordingly, in the Ninth Amendment,
Congress states that the rights of the people are not limited to those outlined in the
Bill of Rights, am;! it reaffirms Madison's view that the enumerated powers of the
federal government should be limited to those specifically listed.
Likewise, the Tenth Amendment confirms the concept oflimitation of power
by enumeration, as well as the framework of federalism. That Amendment reiterates
the fact that, although the Constitutional Convention came together to institute a
national government that was more viable than the government operating under the
Articles of Confederation, they in no way supported the creation of a centralized
government .that could infringe on the liberties of the states or of the people. In other
words, Madison supported the Tenth Amendment because it is consistent with his
notions oflimited government and because it reiterates that, although the people
legitimized the new government to "establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility,
provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty," they did not authorize broad or unlimited federal power.
Nevertheless, this more liberal interpretation of the Constitution has provided the
foundation for many actions by many administrations (Lawson 2009).
Even in the first session of the United States House of Representatives it
became apparent that some of the leaders supported a liberal interpretation of the
General Welfare Clause. In opposition, Madison became the leader of a bloc in
Congress that supported strict Constitutionalism. Eventually, the bloc became the
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Republican Party (sometimes referred to as the Jeffersonian Republican Party or the
Madisonian Republican Party). The advocates of this new platform quarreled most
often with their opponents, Hamilton's Federalist Party, regarding nationalized
financial programs. Although Hamilton argued that the General Welfare Clause in the
Constitution authorized Congress to tax and spend for a broad range of purposes,
Madison, Jefferson, and members of the Republican Party disagreed (Pilon 2005). As
numerous bills were presented to Congress during Madison's service as a
Representative, he was unwavering in his stance that all legislation must be justified
through an explanation of how it secured one of the ends enumerated to the national
government.
Taken together, the ninth and tenth amendments provide a method for
interpreting the Constitution. Madison knew that the benefits of the Constitution
were dependent on how it was interpreted. He knew that each clause of the
Constitution could be understood correctly ifit were read in the context of the whole
document, but he was sure that misunderstandings would undoubtedly arise
(Kearnes). The Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution were added
specifically to guard against a faulty reading of the Constitution that allowed the
federal government to exercise more powers than were enumerated. Those
Amendments were added for "greater caution" and as a guide to the construction of
the rights of the people and the powers of the states (Kearnes).
The suggestion that the federal government was empowered by the General
Welfare Clause to tax citizens and spend public funds for a variety of relief projects
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came under scrutiny in 1789 within the term of the very first Congress. A bill was
introduced to pay a bounty to fisherman at Cape Cod and a subsidy to farmers, and
Madison responded:
Whether the general terms which have been cited [the
General Welfare Clause] are to be considered as a sort
of caption, or general description of the specified
powers; and as having no further meaning, and giving
no further powers, than what is found in that
specification, or as an abstract and indefinite delegation
of power extending to all cases whatever -- to all such,
at least, as will admit the application of money -- which
is giving as much latitude as any government could
well desire. I, sir, have always conceived ... that this is
... a limited government, tied down to the specified
powers, which explain and define the general terms .... I
venture to declare it as my opinion, that, were the
power of Congress to be established in the latitude
contended for, it would subvert the very foundations,
and transmute the very nature of the limited
government established by the people of America; and
what inferences might be drawn, or what consequences
ensue, from such a step, it is incumbent on us all to
consider (www.freerepublic.com).
In this case, Madison explains the context in which the General Welfare
Clause of the Constitution was written and provides what is now a startling prediction
of what might come about if Courts interpret the Constitution too liberally:
It is to be recollected that the terms "common defense
and general welfare," as here used, are not novel terms,
first introduced into this Constitution. They are terms
familiar in their construction, and well known to the
people of America. They are repeatedly found in the old
Articles of Confederation, where, although they are
susceptible of as great a latitude as can be given them
by the context here, it was never supposed or pretended
that they conveyed any such power as is now assigned
to them. On the contrary, it was always considered clear
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and certain that the old Congress was limited to the
enumerated powers, and that the enumeration limited
and explained the general terms .... If Congress can
employ money indefinitely to the general welfare, and
are the sole and supreme judges of the general welfare,
they may take the care of religion into their Own hands;
they may a point teachers in every state, county, and
parish, and pay them out of their public treasury; they
may take into their own hands the education of
children, establishing in like manner schools throughout
the Union; they ·may assume the provision for the poor;
they may undertake the regulation of all roads other
than post-roads; in short, every thing, from the highest
object of state legislation down to the most minute
object of police, would be thrown under the power of
Congress; for every object I have mentioned would
admit of the application of money, and might be called,
if Congress pleased, provisions for the general welfare
(www.freerepublic.com).

In 1794, the House of Representatives debated whether to provide $15,000 for
the relief of French refugees who had fled to Baltimore and Philadelphia from an
insurrection in San Domingo. Although the Annals of Congress highlight the fact
that Madison was sympathetic to the cause and expressed his wish for the suffering of .
the refugees to be alleviated, he was chiefly concerned that such an appropriation of
federal funds would establish a precedent that may be dangerous if applied to a
situation in the future where the recipient was not a charitable cause. Famously, in
opposition to the passage of this piece of legislation, Madison rose from his seat to
say that he could not "undertake to lay [his] finger on that article of the Federal
Constitution which granted a right to Congress of expending, on objects of
benevolence, the money of their constituents" (Pilon 2005). Through his insistence
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that Congress must state which section of the Constitution authorized the passage of
any law, it became evident to Madison's contemporaries that no national initiative or
calamity would authorize Congress to accomplish an end not specifically delegated.
When a bill for the relief of Savannah fire victims was defeated decisively in
Congress at the end of his time of service to the House of Representatives, it was
apparent that he had also inspired a respect for the Constitutional limitation among
other House members. A majority in Congress found that the General Welfare Clause
afforded no authority for so particular an appropriation because it was not
subsequently listed as an enumerated power. Madison's contemporary in the House of
Representatives, William B. Giles observed, "[Congress] should not attend to what ...
generosity and humanity required, but what the Constitution and their duty required"
(Pilon 2005).
Following his term as United States Representative, Madison did not become
lackadaisical in his support oflimited government and strict Constitutional
interpretation. Quite the opposite proved true. Although he was a private citizen, his
help was enlisted by the Virginia Legislature to draft the Virginia Resolution of 1798.
In secret, he drafted this resolution to elucidate the position of the opposition to the
Alien and Sedition Acts passed by the Adams Presidency. The Alien and Sedition
Acts of 1789 were the results of war hysteria and partisan politics. In response to
French depredations on American shipping interests preparing for war, Congress and
President John Adams passed a bill to give the Administration power to send
suspected Aliens away. Moreover, the Act contained a sedition bill designed to
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suppress the Whig press, which had been assailing the President. When that bill
passed, it became a penal offense to publish any false, scandalous, and malicious
writing against the government with the intent of bringing it into disrepute (Kearnes ).

In response, Madison began the Virginia Resolution:
"That this Assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily
declare, that it views the powers of the federal
government, as resulting from the compact, to which
the states are parties; as limited by the plain sense and
intention of the instrument constituting the compact; as
no °further valid that they are authorized by the grants
enumerated in that compact; and that in case of a
deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other
powers, not granted by the said compact, the states who
are parties thereto, have the right, and are in duty
bound, to interpose for arresting the progress of the
evil, and for maintaining within their respective limits,
the authorities, rights and liberties appertaining to
them." Emphasis added.
(Madison 1978)
Partnering with Jefferson, Madison prepared a resolution in clear opposition
to The Alien and Sedition Acts, stating that they prohibited all criticism of the
government and seemed to ensure the Federalist majority in Congress would be
permanent. With Madison's Resolution, the Republican Party attempted to offer an
alternative vision and a clear statement of Constitutional principles, which Madison
desired for this country to embrace (Gutzman).

As president, Madison and the government he had created were put to a
serious test. After being forced into war with Great Britain in 1812 by a firebrand
Congress and Jefferson's failed "embargo" policies, Madison lifted the morale of a
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poorly prepared and ill-defended nation. After British troops burned the White House ·
and much of the national capital, a "homeless" president with an upbeat spirit became
the symbol of national reconstruction. Because of his optimism and patience,
Madison became the symbol of national reconstruction. Even when New England
states failed to support the war and threatened secession, Madison was able to
preserve American independence and its unity as a nation (Felzenberg 2001).
While serving as President during this critical time in American history,
Madison had the opportunity to take advantage of the national crisis and enlarge the
reach of the federal governments, as so many administrations have done in the time
following Madison's terms as President. Instead, Madison acted consistently with the .
Constitutional vision that he maintained throughout his political career. While he
recognized that there was a definite need for a strong national government to secure
and to protect the rights of citizens, especially during a time of war, he was faithful to
his position that the powers of the government extended only so far as the enumerated
responsibilities.
As an example of Madison's commitment to a limited federal government,
during his final act as President in February of 1817, Madison vetoed legislation that
provided for public works and internal domestic improvements (Bradford 1982, 152).
While some people claimed that the crisis of war justified an expansion of the federal
government, Madison disagreed. He expressed clearly that he was unable, as a
political leader who had sworn allegiance to the Constitution, to approve of
legislation that was not authorized by any enumerated power.
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The legislative powers vested in Congress are specified
and enumerated in the eighth section of the first article
of the Constitution, and it does not appear that the
power proposed to be exercised by the bill is among the
enumerated powers, or that it falls by any just
interpretation with the power to make laws necessary
and proper for carrying into execution those or other
powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of
the United States. To refer the power in question to the
clause "to provide for common defense and general
welfare" would be contrary to the established and
consistent rules of interpretation, as rendering the
special and careful enumeration of powers, which
follow the clause nugatory and improper. Such a view
of the Constitution would have the effect of giving to
Congress a general power of legislation instead of the
defined and limited one hitherto understood to belong
to them, the terms "common defense and general
welfare" embracing every object and act within the
purview of a legislative trust. ... But seeing that such a
power is not expressly given by the Constitution, and
believing that it can not be deduced from any part of it
without an inadmissible latitude of construction and
reliance on insufficient precedents; believing also that
the permanent success of the Constitution depends on a
definite partition of powers between the General and
the State Governments, and that no adequate landmarks
would be left by the constructive extension of the
powers of Congress as proposed in the bill, I have no
option but to withhold my signature from it.
Emphasis added. (Madison 1817)
As evidenced in these and numerous other examples, the intent of the
founding fathers was to establish a limited government. Madison, in particular, had
the foresight to realize that the General Welfare Clause may be liberally interpreted to
increase the scope of the federal government beyond that which was intended or
which would be beneficial in the long term. To suggest that that the General Welfare
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Clause grants a substantial amount of power disregards the intention of this statesman
and Father of the Constitution.·
Perhaps Madison expressed it best when he explained: "With respect to the
twb words "general welfare," I have always regarded them as qualified by the detail
of powers connected with them. To take them in a literal and unlimited sense would
be a metamorphosis of the Constitution into a character which there is a host of
proofs was not contemplated by its creators." A liberal interpretation of the General
Welfare Clause makes the enumeration of specific powers superfluous, which simply
cannot be correct (Grossman 2009).

Progressive Era Redefines the General Welfare Clause
Although men with ideals consistent to Madison's founded and managed the
country by a strict interpretation of the Constitution for decades, the onset of the
Great Depression challenged the validity of laissez faire economic theory and tested
men's faith in the power of a limited government. Leading with continued faith in
this principle, President Herbert Hoover maintained a limited government during the
early years ofthis national crisis and explained to the people that, "[eJconomic
depression cannot be cured by legislative action or executive pronouncement.
Economic wounds must be healed by the action of the cells of the economic body the producers and consumers themselves" (Hoover).
While Hoover attempted to let the market self correct from the Depression in
the early thirties, American citizens called for change. As a result of Hoover's
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inaction, he was not elected for a second term (Hail 2008). When President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt took office in 1933 following Hoover, he immediately began to
draft ambitious policies designed to stimulate the suffering economy of the United
States. Within just a few days of his 1933 inauguration, the President called Congress
into special session and introduced a record of 15 major bills (Ganze! 2003).
Congress consented to President Roosevelt's aggressive agenda because the general
public was frightened of what might occur if the federal government did not intervene
to put an end to the Great Depression. Roosevelt's initiatives including the National
Housing Act, the Securities Exchange Act, the Federal Credit Union Act, and the
Banking Act (Learning Bank). Roosevelt's legislative agenda became known as The
New Deal. It was with the Roosevelt Administration that Americans began to
perceive the government as a "demigod" that can solve all problems (Hail 2008).
Throughout his presidency, Roosevelt enjoyed immense popularity, and
because he was elected and reelected by wide margins, he felt he had a mandate to
push his legislative agenda through Congress. Tojustify the sweeping legislation of
the New Deal, Roosevelt used his bully pulpit to convince the nation that the dire
situation of the economy required unprecedented action (Bendavid 2009). While his
policies enjoyed broad support both in Congress and in the population as a whole, the
Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, found
that several New Deal programs were unconstitutional.
In its haste to implement the first wave of public assistance programs called for
by Roosevelt, Congress wrote emergency bills that were hastily drawn and poorly
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drafted. Because of the makeshift character of this legislation and the fact that many
provisions of the bills seemed to run counter to the Constitution, requests for judicial
review began to mount (Pusey 1958). During 1935 and 1936, the Supreme Court
ruled in favor of business interests and anti-regulation proponents in many cases it
heard, challenging New Deal provisions. Specifically, although the Court recognized
that legislation had been passed to help provide relief from the economic conditions of
the Depression, it nevertheless found that the Constitution does not grant Congress a
general power to regulate for the promotion of the general welfare. Pointedly, the
Court stated, "To a constitutional end, many ways are open; but to an end not within
the terms of the Constitution, all ways are closed" (Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 1936). In
this way, the Court attempted to prevent the Roosevelt Administration from setting
dangerous precedent (Rauh 1990).
On "Black Monday," May 27, 1935, the Court dealt its most devastating blow
to the New Deal. Specifically, on that date the Court unanimously invalidated three
initiatives of the Roosevelt Administration (Martin 2007). By year-end, the Court
had ruled against the administration's interests in nearly every New Deal case it
'
considered. Frustrated with what he feared would be the Court's obstruction to the
full realization of his executive and legislative agenda, Roosevelt even sought to
neutralize the Court by initiating both a public relations war and a legislative battle to
alter the makeup of the federal judiciary.
Four of the nine Justices were ardent conservatives who seemed to regard the
New Deal as a governmental overstep and a violation ofliberty. These four, who
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became known as the "Four Horsemen," were Justice Willis Van Devanter, Justice
James C. McReynolds, Justice George Sutherland, and Justice Pierce Butler (Nelson
1988). The Horsemen consistently voted against New Deal legislation, and a number
of them also demonstrated a personal dislike for the President. For instance, Justice
McReynolds once stated, "I'll never retire as long as that crippled son-of-a-bitch is
still in the White House" (Martin 2007). Because the other Horsemen seemed to
share McReynolds' feeling, this group posed a significant threat to Roosevelt's
complete implementation of his New Deal initiatives.
A separate faction of the Court seemed to grow increasingly receptive to the
New Deal legislation as the Great Depression lengthened. These men, including
Justice Louis D. Brandeis, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, and Justice Benjamin N.
Cardozo, came to be called the "Three Musketeers" (Lazarus 1999, 283). Despite the
unanimous decisions rendered in the three opinions of the Court on "Black Monday,"
the "Three Musketeers" seemed more disposed to allow the elected branches of
government wide latitude in framing public policies (Martin 2007).
The remaining two justices, Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Owen J.
Roberts, were the swing votes on the Court during the Roosevelt era. The Chief
Justice became known as "Solomon" for his wisdom, and Justice Roberts, who often
concurred with the more conservative Justices, gained the nickname "Swinger"
(Nelson 1988).
With increasing frequency Roosevelt expressed disappointment that he was
the first president since James Monroe to serve a full term without having the
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opportunity to appoint a Supreme Court Justice (Nelson 1988). He openly criticized
the Justices for what he perceived as their inability to grasp the negative effects their
decisions would have on American society (Nelson 1988). By 1937 he clearly felt
that he had to take some action, particularly to combat the bloc of conservative
Justices, if the New Deal was to be saved and expanded (Rauh 1990).
The action Roosevelt took soon backfired, however. Roosevelt's bold plan
involved increasing the number of Justices sitting on the Supreme Court. While
Article III of the Constitution gives Congress the power to fix the number of Supreme
Court Justices, it does not set a minimum or maximum number to be met
(Constitution of the United States 1787). Roosevelt's bill proposed that Congress be
granted power to appoint an extra Justice for every sitting Justice over the age of 70½
(Martin 2007). Clearly, Roosevelt wagered that because most of the sitting Justices
were over that age, and Brandeis was eighty-one, the public would agree with a plan
to reinvigorate the "Court of Methuselahs" or "The Nine Old Men" as the Court had
become known (Martin 2007). If the bill had been passed and the six Justices over
seventy years of age had retired, Roosevelt would have been allowed to appoint six
additional Justices immediately (Cushman 1994). After introducing this legislation,
which would come to be known as the "Court-Packing Plan," Roosevelt lost
popularity and suffered a major blow to his image (Martin 2007). The public did not
support the Judiciary Reorganization Bill of 1937, and the President eventually
withdrew it.
Despite the intense public support for the Court expressed during the

37

discussions around the Judicial Reorganization Act, the year 193 7 saw a decisive shift
in the ideological alignment of the Justices. Most notably, during this year Justice
Roberts consistently aligned hiinselfwith the more liberal Justices and enabled these
New Deal proponents to achieve majority status and uphold a number of decisive
pieces of!egislation. Of equal importance to the makeup of the Court, Justice Van
Devanter retired that year, enabling Roosevelt to appoint a liberal Justice to the bench
and solidify the liberal majority of the Court. Accordingly, the impetus for the
passage of the Judicial Reorganization Act was lost and the judicial struggle against
the New Deal ended (Rauh 1990). Roosevelt withdrew his "Court-Packing Plan"
while it was still in committee (Martin 2007). After the bill was withdrawn, people
began to refer to the unexpected change in philosophy of Justice Roberts as the
"switch in time that saved the nine" (Cushman 1994).
Undoubtedly, Roosevelt was thrilled with the Court's ruling in the West Coast
Hotel case. The case seemed to be an unequivocal signal that the Court would be

more liberal in approving New Deal legislation in the future. The Court's opinion in
West Coast Hotel included the following significant language:

We may take judicial notice of the unparalleled demands for relief which
arose during the recent period of depression and still continue to an alarming
extent despite the degree of economic recovery which has been achieved.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Sutherland in the West Coast Hotel case,
which was joined by the other three Horsemen, insinuates that the public support for
the New Deal swayed Roberts' change of Constitutional interpretation:
[I]n passing upon the validity of a statute, he discharges a duty imposed upon
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him, which cannot be consummated justly by an automatic acceptance of the
views of others which have neither convinced, nor created a reasonable doubt
in, his mind. If upon a question so important he thus surrenders his deliberate
judgment, he stands forsworn. He cannot subordinate his convictions to that
extent and keep faith with his oath or retain his judicial and moral independence
(West Coast Hotel Co. v. _Parrish 1937).
This brash language reveals that the passions of the day affected even the comity of
the Court.
While his relationship with the Court had a tumultuous beginning, virtually all
of Roosevelt's New Deal reforms were eventually upheld. While he had been
embarrassed by the reaction his "Court-Packing Plan" received, Roosevelt was
eventually able to bring about enough changes in the American economic system to
protect the nation against the perceived ills of laissez-faire capitalism. In that sense,
Roosevelt lost the battle over the structure of the Supreme Court but he won the war
over the appropriate power of the federal government with respect to managing
economic affairs. The intensity of the struggle, however, reveals that it required dire
economic distress and ardent political confrontations to bring about the initial change
from government as a protector to government as a provider of rights.
Despite some public misperceptions, it is now commonly thought that World
War II, not the New Deal, provided the stimulus that brought the American economy
out of the Great Depression. In fact, some economists today even argue that New
Deal policies retarded the nation's economic recovery. In an often-.cited scholarly
paper, Harold L. Cole of UCLA and Lee E. Ohanian of UCLA and the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis maintain that the Depression would have ended in
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1936, rather than in 1943, were it not for Roosevelt's policies that magnified the
power of labor and encouraged the cartelization of industries (Will 2008). According
to many experts, it was the draft, not Roosevelt's liberal policies that caused the
country to go from record unemployment' to virtually full employment. Moreover, it
was the national production necessary to wage war, not Roosevelt's liberal economic
agenda, that caused American industrial production to go from record lows to high
output growth (Smiley 2007).
Although historical evidence points to the fact that the New Deal failed to end
and, in fact, might have prolonged the Depression, many citizens today continue to
·call for the federal government to provide assurance of certain levels of economic
prosperity (Will 2008). These citizens doubt that the capitalistic system that has
made the economy of the United States the envy of the world can solve the present
economic woes. In commenting on this situation, Professors Cole and Ohanian note
the following:
The fact that the Depression dragged on for years convinced generations of
economists and policy-makers that capitalism could not be trusted to recover
from depressions and that significant government intervention was required to
achieve good outcomes. Ironically, our work shows that the recovery would
have been very rapid had the government not intervened (Sullivan 2004).
Without regard for this economic explanation as to what actually ended the
Great Depression, modern Americans rely on the myth that Roosevelt's initiatives
ended the years of extreme poverty in the United States. While this is not the case,
the precedent that was set by the initiatives contained in the New Deal certainly did
begin the United States moving on a path towards a welfare state and the pace with
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which it is moving in this direction has only accelerated since his terms in office.
Because the centralized government assumed the role of providing assistance in times
of financial need during this time of national crisis, even during times of normal
economic activity, individual citizens are justified in acting less prudently with the
belief that the government will remedy any bad consequence down the road.

Development of Welfare Since the Progressive Era
As soon as the notion of centralized governmental action with respect to the
nation's economic woes was legitimated in the minds of Americans, the transition
from a capitalist economy towards a welfare state progressed rapidly. In less than a
century, the American welfare system has been dramatically expanded and, some
would say, substantially improved. Others, however, lament that welfare in the
United States has shifted away from what Roosevelt began in an attempt to provide
assistance to needy families to what has become a system of entitlement and abuse by
both the state and the welfare recipient.
Absent from either evaluation, however, is the question of whether the
American welfare system constitutes a legitimate exercise of power within the
framework of the Constitution. Instead, the General Welfare Clause seems to have
provided a launching pad from which those who advocate a liberal interpretation of
the Constitution have initiated dozens of pieces of social legislation and welfare
programs.

41

The first of these incremental shifts towards a centrally planned economy was
through the Social Security Act of 1935, created by President Franklin D. Roosevelt
to establish a minimum under which the government would not let an individual or
family fall. This "poverty line," as it came to be known, has since been an important
benchmark against which all welfare programs are measured. The initial motivation
for placing a dollar amount on the minimum quality of life that is acceptable was to
provide assistance to families in which a parent, who was the breadwinner, was
unable to provide financially for his/her family, due to death or disability.
Although the New Deal legislation provided the critical step of establishing
precedent for accepting the federal government's involvement in economic regulation
for the advancement of the general welfare, the majority of entitlement programs that
have come into existence in the United States were created as tactics in the War on
Poverty. President John F. Kennedy identified the enemy in this war after reading
two articles: The first was Homer Bigart's New York Times series on Appalachian
poverty and the second was Dwight MacDonald's extensive review in The New
Yorker of Michael Harrington's The Other America (Germany, 4). The awareness
that was created by these works, combined with the official launch of the War on
Poverty by President Lyndon B. Johnson on the front porch of an Appalachian home
in Inez, Kentucky (Jones 2000).
This War on Poverty quickly grew into a multi-faceted attempt to attack the
root causes of poverty. Policymakers sought reform in a wide range of areas that
included education, housing, health, employment, civic participation, and
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psychological disposition (Germany, 5). Within the first year of President Johnson's
declaration of war, vast new bureaucracies were established and the Economic
Opportunity Act provided for a variety of social services: Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC), Volunteers in Service to America, Head Start, the Job
Corps, Upward Bound, Legal Services, the Neighborhood Youth Corps, the
Community Action Program, the college Work-Study program, Neighborhood
Development Centers, small business loan programs, rural programs, migrant worker
programs, remedial education projects, local health care centers, and others
(Germany, 1-2).
Other important measures that were passed with the intention to serve
antipoverty functions included the Revenue Act, the Voting Rights Act, the Model
Cities Act, the Fair Housing Act, the Wilderness Protection Act, the Water Quality
Acts, the Civil Rights Act, the Food Stamp Act, the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act, the Higher Education Act, the Social Security amendments that
created Medicare and Medicaid, the creation of the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, several job-training programs, and various urban renewalrelated projects (Germany, 1-2). Even in comparison to the liberal agenda of
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, President Johnson was able to push through an
unprecedented amount of antipoverty legislation (Germany, 1-2).
In 1969, President Richard Nixon proposed the Family Assistance Plan (FAP),
which would have provided a guaranteed cash income to all families, as an alternative
to public assistance programs. At the time, many policy analysts identified that the
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regr~ssive tax structure that exsited in many states caused millions of former welfare
recipients to be taxed back into poverty. In response, Nixon designed the F AP around
Nobel Prize winning economist Milton Friedman's theories of how to "make work
pay" and provide assitance for families who choose to remain in the workforce
(Levitis and Koulish 2008b). Friedman, who was the first to articulate the concept of
a negative income tax policy in his 1962 book, Capitalism and Freedom, envisioned a
tax structure that would provide an incentive for people to supplement their earnings
by increasing the number of hours they work. Friedman opposed Nixon's FAP that
implemented his negative tax concept, however, because that legislation
supplemented other. anti-poverty programs rather than replacing them. According to
Friedman, adding a negative income tax to existing anti-poverty legislation would
create very high cumulative marginal tax rates for families who received benefits
from multiple programs (Moffitt 2003).
When it became evident that the FAP did not have the support of Congress or
the nation, Senator Russell Long, then Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee,
developed an alternative proposal. Long was quoted as saying that the FAP proposed
to "pay people not to work" while his plan did not (Marguerite Casey Foundation
2005). Long had been greatly influenced by Friedman's theories, and he became a
member of the new generation of American policymakers who began to view tax
policy as a means of achieving macroeconomic goals (Fact Sheets). Long's proposal
called for a tax credit for low-income taxpayers who work, which he called a "work
bonus." While the proposal passed the Senate in 1974, the House then rejected it.
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After President Ford called for simulative tax cuts, however, Congress enacted the
"work bonus," now commonly referred to as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC),
as part of the Tax Reduction Act of 1975. The Senate Committee Report concerning
this bill records the following statement about the goals for the new act:
This new refundable credit will provide relief to families who currently pay
little or no income tax. These people have been hurt the most by rising food
and energy costs. Also, in almost all cases, they are subject to the social
security payroll tax on their earnings. Because it will increase their after-tax
earnings, the new credit, in effect, provides an added bonus or incentive for
low-income people to work, and therefore, should be of importance in
inducing individuals with families receiving Federal assistance to support
themselves (Marguerite Casey Foundation 2005).

Unlike most tax credits, the EITC, which remains a central part of welfare
initiatives today, was originally designed as a refundable tax credit, meaning that a
recipient's tax owed may be reduced to less than zero. Because most low-income
workers owe little to no taxes, the EITC provided cash benefits to eligible recipients.
The dollar amount by which the EITC reduced a workers tax obligation was not a
fixed number, however. Rather, the amount of the EITC was determined in a formula .
that took into account the salary and family structure of each individual worker (Holt
2006). In addition, there was a corresponding phase-out range for each family
structure (Marguerite Casey Foundation 2005).
This subtle decrease in the amount of the transfer payment was necessary
because the benefits of the EITC extend to taxpayers earning levels of income that are
much higher than those typically helped through social welfare programs (Moffitt
2003). To ensure that the policy was an equitable and an appropriate use of public
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funds, therefore, the government had determined the income levels to increase, to
maintain, or to decrease the amount by which tax credits are given. Overall, the
complex structure of the program attempted to efficiently create and to equitably
administer incentives for workers to recognize the higher potential income from
working than from welfare (Webster and Weeks 1995).
Enjoying broad based bipartisan support, the EITC was expanded numerous
times since it's original introduction in the 70's. In 1984, for example, President
Ronald Reagan used his State of the Union Address to impel Congress to implement
sweeping reforms to the United States tax code, including an expansion of the EITC.
As a result, Congress passed the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which firmly established
the EITC as a permanent and key element of the federal government's strategy to
fight poverty. As part of this tax act, President Reagan proposed and Congress
accepted two notable changes to the EITC: the amount of the credit was increased,
and it was indexed for inflation (Marguerite Casey Foundation 2005).
To an even greater degree than the Tax Reform Act of 1986, various pieces of
legislation during the 1990's increased and expanded the scope of the EITC. First, in ·
an omnibus budget bill in 1990, Congress increased the size of the credit and, for the
first time, added a supplemental credit for families with two or more children. Then,
in 1993, President Bill Clinton proposed a substantial increase in the EITC. He
explained that:
[T]his will be the first time in the history of our country when we' 11 be able to
say that if you work 40 hours a week and you have children in your home, you
will be lifted out ofpoverty. It is an elemental, powerful, and profound

46

principle. It is not liberal or conservative. It should belong to no party. It
ought to become part of the American creed (Marguerite Casey Foundation
2005).

In response to President Clinton's proposal, Congress increased the credit
further and made a small credit available for taxpayers between the ages of 25 and 64
with no children. This new credit was created, in significant part, to offset the effect
of tax increases on low-income workers (Marguerite Casey Foundation 2005).
Specifically, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1993 substantially
increased the amount of the EITC, with the increase to be phased in from 1994
through 1996. Due to this incremental expansion, by 1996 the EITC had become "the
largest cash or near-cash program directed toward low income households." In
addition, OBRA added a supplemental credit for families with two or more children
(Marguerite Casey Foundation 2005).
Although the EITC contributed a great deal of success to the welfare system,
the statistics reporting the success of welfare initiatives to pull individuals out of
poverty were grim in the late 80s's. For example, nearly two-thirds of women on
welfare were expected to require assistance for eight years or more. The average
length of time spent on welfare was 11.6 years. More disturbing was the statistic that
nearly two-thirds of all young women who received benefits from Aid to Families
with Dependent Children gave birth to at least one child while still a teenager.
Because these families were likely to spend a decade or longer on welfare, it was
unlikely that the children would experience an example of a responsible role model

47

during their most formative years (Rector & Butterfield 1987, 2). Due to these
disheartening statistics, the most substantial reform to the United States welfare
system occurred in 1996 as the result of cooperation between President Clinton and a
Republican Congress.
The 1996 legislation, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), essentially dismantled the traditional welfare
system and eliminated the reliance of entitlement feature in welfare legislation to
transfer cash assistance to poor families. Instead, with this .act, Congress began to rely
more heavily on the tax code to provide relief for America's working poor. As a
result, the low-income population experienced a great reduction in the number of
people eligible for long-term cash support (Eissa and Nichols, 90). To address the
fears some people had that the regressive tax structure in many states would cause
millions of former welfare recipients to be taxed back into poverty, the EITC benefits
in PRWORA were expanded. This expansion was meant to provide support for
needy families while rewarding those who chose to remain in the workforce and
subject themselves to local, state, and federal taxes (Levitis and Koulish 2008a).
More specifically, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), which is
still in existence today, required that single parents be involved in at least twenty
hours of work per week within two years of receiving assistance, and married couples
must participate in the work programs. Federal funds could only be used to provide a
total of five years of welfare assistance in a lifetime to a family. Able-bodied
childless adults aged eighteen to fifty-four would be eligible to receive food stamps
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for a total of three months in any three-year period. If such individuals lose their job,
an additional three months of food stamps will be allowed once in a three-year period
(Garkovich 1997). These changes shifted the emphasis of welfare programs from
hardship alleviation to temporary stopgap measures (Zimmerman and Dyk 2000, 1).
It is for this reason that many refer to T ANF as a welfare-to-work initiative.
Importantly, PRWORA changed the method by which welfare funds were
distributed. T ANF is funded through block grants to states. The states then have
flexibility to develop and implement their own welfare initiatives (Whitener et al.
2003). The funds may be used for an array of items, including child care, job
training, and cash assistance (Spaid 1997). In theory, devolution allowed the local
governments, which would be responsible for distributing welfare benefits, to better
respond to the needs of their communities (Tickamyer et al. 2007, 2). In the
Appalachian region, Kentucky was one of the first states to respond with its own plan,
Kentucky Transitional Assistance Program (K-TAP), and in doing so secured an
additional $10 million in federal funds (Garkovich 1997).
Within the first decade following the passage of PRWORA, more than 3.5
million people nationwide were removed from the welfare rolls (Armey 2004). This
piece of legislation fundamentally changed the tactics of the War on Poverty and
caused many to assert that, although the war was launched in 1964, "it wasn't until
1996 that we truly began winning it" (Armey 2004). The favorable opinions of
TANF were attributable to the elimination of welfare's entitlement status, which
attempted to change the mindset of those who felt they had an automatic right to
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benefits (Armey 2004). In more rural regions of the country, however, there were less
impressive results. The difference was likely due to variations in State welfare
program implementation and the encumbering characteristics of the region earlier
identified and later discuss~d (Whitener et al. 2003).
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 made significant changes to the United
States tax code but not changes that directly amended the EITC. Rather, this act
significantly affected the majority of EITC beneficiaries because the "centerpiece" of
the act was a new tax benefit for families with children through the Child Tax credit.
Like the EITC, the Child Tax credit was a negative income tax (Fact Sheets).
Unfortunately, however, this legislation did not change the fact that the working poor
who are eligible to claim both the EITC and the Child Credit must complete separate
forms (Marguerite Casey Foundation 2005, 5).
In spite of reductions in caseloads and the time limits imposed on welfare
beneficiaries that resulted from the policies contained in PRWORA, the welfare
system today is an extremely expensive institution. The estimated cost of welfare
from the beginning of the War on Poverty through the end of the millennium was
$8.29 trillion adjusted for inflation in the year 2000 (Rector 2001). In fact, in fiscal
year 2000, total federal and state spending on welfare programs throughout the nation
was $434 billion. In comparison, if the welfare spending in the year when President
Johnson launched the War on Poverty were adjusted for inflation, it would amount to
$42 billion. In sum, calculating the expense of welfare, it is clear that costs have
increased ten fold since the 1960's (Rector 2001).

50

Some of the high price tags for poverty alleviation efforts through welfare are
the result of the fact that six departments of the federal government are involved with
its implementation: the Department for Health and Human Services, the Department
of Agriculture, the Department of Labor, the Treasury Department, and the
Department of Education. It is not unusual for a welfare-dependent family to receive
goods or services from more than one of these organizations simultaneously (Rector
2001). Because of this overlap in benefits and because the federal government
mandates much of the state welfare spending with the block grants provided through
TANF, it is a difficult and misleading task to disaggregate welfare spending by the
level of government or by program (Rector 200 I).
Despite each of the creative government initiatives outlined above and in spite
of the massive outlays to poverty-stricken communities and individuals, general
consensus is that the federal government has not effectively alleviated poverty in the
United States. Moreover, the trivial success that some point towards is not
proportionate to the enormous budget and extensive infrastructure required for its
perpetuation. This failure of entitlement programs to improve standards of living for
the poor intensifies the sting that these initiatives have come about in conjunction
with an increasing tendency for Americans to disregard the constraints outlined in the
Constitution and to gradually accept the notion of a centrally planned economy.

Causes of Welfare's Ineffectiveness
The realization that Americans have paid high price tags to maintain largely
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unsuccessful welfare programs demands an explanation of why this situation would
persist for decades. The apparent conundrum is resolved by an analysis of the
incentives created by the entitlement system. Although no one is an open advocate of
poverty, it is undeniable that welfare creates mal-incentives of bureaucrats, recipients,
and taxpayers, which perpetuate its existence. In spite of the widespread agreement
regarding the shortcomings of the War on Poverty, the force of the motivations of
each stakeholder in welfare has made the antipoverty framework a mainstay in
American social policy (Germany, 7).
Although it is possible that the politicians and legislators who initially
designed and implemented welfare institutions had good intentions, in light of the
wi~espread agreement that dependence on transfer payments has been the unwanted
outcome of the majority of initiatives that began during the War on Poverty, it is
difficult to assert that those who advocate the continuation of welfare programs have
altruistic motives. Although antipoverty programs were, in theory, designed for the
purpose of making themselves obsolete (Baetjer 1984), it is undeniable that the
thousands of bureaucrats employed by the welfare programs have a financial
disincentive to eradicating the problem of poverty.
This moral hazard, combined with the fact that the majority of welfare
programs sustain people who are in poverty rather than help move them out of
poverty (Garkovich 1997), has led to a number of harsh critiques regarding the
motives of bureaucrats who are involved in the distribution of welfare benefits: For
example, Thomas Sowell asserted that "the poor are a gold-mine" for those who work
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in the bureaucracy (Baetjer 1984). Similarly, M. Stanton Evans points out that the
salaries of civil servants, contractors, and consultants have consumed an enormous
portion of the spending that has been outlaid over the decades as part of the War on
Poverty (Baetjer 1984). Twenty-five years ago, Howard Baetjer Jr. powerfully
expressed the propensity for government programs to be more expensive and less
effective than free-market solutions in his article entitled "Does Welfare Diminish
Poverty?":
A final effect of government-provided welfare that we would
expect to find, knowing how human beings behave, is
inefficiency and waste. This is a phenomenon we might call
"government failure": the inherent inability of government to
do much of anything well. Since bureaucrats are paid out of tax
revenues, which are collected regardless of whether or not the
bureaucracy does a good job, there is little incentive for them
to maintain high standards. Since the amount of taxpayers'
money that passes through their hands depends on the size and
perceived importance of their programs, the bureaucrats have
an incentive to expand the numbers encompassed by those
programs, and to find new reasons for increased funding
(Baetjer 1984).
Certainly bureaucrats are not the only party with an interest in the
continuation of welfare programs. Had the trillions of dollars spent on the War on
Poverty been able to alleviate all poverty that exists today, it is no less true that
legislation of this sort may cause an increase in the number of individuals requesting
assistance in the future. Because transfer payments artificially soften the effects of
apathetic educational, employment, family structure decisions, they could lead to
more bad decisions and, in turn, additional poverty. It is probable that the guarantee
of this assistance has contributed to the prevalence of the occurrence of these types of
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problem in modem society. If the United States is to adhere to its free-market roots,
people must be made to realize that the risk of loss is a necessary evil.
The concept of moral hazard exists on the complete opposite end of the
spectrum. This economic principle explains how a perception of diminished risk may
lead a rational actor to assume additional risk. This phenomenon has historically
been observed in situations in which the presence of insurance tends to "encourage
behavior that increases the risk of insured loss" (Anderson 2000). The type of moral
hazard that exists with the welfare system is analogous to the economic phenomenon
known as the principal-agent problem.

In a principal-agent problem, the motives of an agent (the welfare recipient
who would like the transfer payments to continue indefinitely) do not match those of
the principal on whose behalf actions are taken (the taxpayer who would like to
provide short term assistance in times of serious financial hardship) (Alexander et. al
2002, 695). Because prior promises of governmental assistance have created the
perception that someone else will perpetually take responsibility for predicaments
resulting from poor decisions, many feel that already have supplied the necessary
conditions for moral hazard to arise, thereby exacerbating the current problem.
Reasonably, those who experience times of financial distress have come to expect
that the government will pursue any necessary means to ease the economy out of any
recession.
The existence of a moral hazard problem was essentially admitted with the
replacement of AFDC with T ANF. Not only did conservatives argue that structural
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disincentives to work were embedded in the early welfare system, liberals recognized
the need for time limits to reduce the possibility that welfare recipients would rely on
the generous benefits provided by the government rather than returning to work
(Tickamyer et al. 2007, 4).
Neither the job security desired by bureaucrats, nor the complacent attitude
adopted by welfare recipients can entirely explain the fact that the government
directing billions of dollars into the welfare system for nearly a century has not
alleviated persistent poverty. Why have voters and taxpayers sat idly by while tax
dollars are funneled into ineffective entitlement programs?
The answer relies once again on Adam Smith's philosophy in the Theory of

Moral Sentiments: There is a wiqespread belief that, as citizens of the most
prosperous nation in the world, we have a responsibility to care for those less
fortunate than ourselves. Bureaucrats manipulate this laudable emotion by proposing
legislation that is intended to increase their own departments, budgets, or power under
the guise of concern for the poor. Moreover, as the percentage of the population that
receives entitlements in some form continues to rise, it becomes easier and easier for
the majority vote to be attained.
Whether politicians secure votes by convincing prosperous men that they
should feel guilty for their financial success or by persuading people experiencing
hardship that they need the government's assistance, once the legislation passes, the
economic principle of "crowding out" takes effect. This theory explains that
government spending is to some degree offset by a reduction in private investment.
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As it applies to the economic transaction of entitlement spending, when a
bureaucratic transfer of wealth occurs to alleviate the effects of poverty, taxpayers
feel that their obligation to be charitable is met, although indirectly. Furthermore, as
poverty persists, voters are encouraged that more funding is required to combat its ill
effects in society.
As a result, the welfare system grows and grows. American citizens fail to
realize, however, that a large portion of their contribution actually funds the massive
bureaucracy required to administer welfare benefits. In this way, although voters
often support welfare legislation because it allows them to feel as though they have
acted morally and charitably, the ultimate outcome of their vote is not the
achievement of their original intent to provide effective assistance to those in need.
The interplay between each of these mal-incentives not only explains why
welfare has grown over the decades, but it also elucidates why the entitlement
programs are entrenched into the American system of government. Moreover, the
analysis of bureaucratic motivation for the continuation of welfare makes it seem
plausible that the incremental expansions of the American welfare system were
designed as part of an overarching plan to increasing the power of the federal
government. Failing to realize this, Americans have allowed the federal government
to overstep its Constitutional constraints while being unconcerned with whether it
actually achieves its purported goals.
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Case Study: Welfare in Appalachia
Although understanding the perverse incentives of bureaucrats, welfare
recipients, and taxpayers is valuable in understanding the ineffectiveness of welfare
across the nation, a look into obstacles faced by some of the poorest areas of the
country go further to explain why transfer payments into these regions are failing to
solve the problem of persistent poverty.
In fact, few stereotypes are as well established in American culture as that of
uneducated, unemployed, and unwed mothers living in Appalachia who draw their
income from the government's welfare rolls. Unfortunately, reality in this
impoverished region involves poverty not only for single mothers but also for married
couples, young and elderly alike.
Recognizing the characteristics of this region that have trapped generations in
poverty reconciles why policy makers have for decades struggled without avail to
design programs to provide a remedy for the persistent poverty of the Appalachian
region. Despite what may have been noble intentions, most observers agree that
President Ronald Reagan was right in 1988 when he stated that, in America's War on
Poverty, "poverty won" (Germany, 11). Even individuals who cannot agree with
President Reagan that poverty won in the nation at large will concede that poverty has
persisted in the Appalachian region despite the massive spending as part of the War.
If, in contrast, the surge of federal welfare initiatives had been successful,
Appalachia would have experienced declining poverty rates and then declining
bureaucratic budgets required to combat the weakened enemy. Instead, the
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Appalachian region failed to experience falling poverty rates and the political region
characterized by persistent hardship has grown in size and in the amount of funding
required for its improvement (Alford 2008).

It is difficult to ascertain the dollar amount of government transfer payments
that have benefited the Appalachian region specifically. This difficulty arises because
the political boundaries have changed numerous times in the past forty years. As a
result, the calculation would involve a different set of counties during different time
periods. Moreover, if it were possible to hold the territory of the Appalachian
Regional Commission constant, the figures of overall spending would be somewhat
fruitless.
Even among the counties identified as Appalachia, there are vast differences
in the allocations of funds: For example, the federal government sent more than $12
million worth of food stamps in 2006 to Kentucky's Harlan County, according to the
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. In the same year, however, Kentucky's Nicholas
County received just $1.1 million. These differences in spending reflect the
differences in need. For example, the annual jobless rates in Kentucky's Harlan
County ranged from 13 percent in 1997 to 9 .1 percent last year in 2008. In
comparison, Kentucky's Nicholas County annual jobless rates ranged from 4.4
percent to 6.4 percent for the same periods (Alford 2008).
While debates about welfare dependence typically focus on the incentives
created by transfer payments, to comprehend the problem fully, policy makers must
also take into consideration the environment in which the recipients live. This
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understanding is required in order to establish reasonable expectations of recipients'
abilities to move off of welfare rolls. To evaluate the success of welfare in
Appalachia, for example, it is relevant to understand that poverty in rural areas has
historically been higher than both overall poverty rates and poverty rates in urban
areas (Zimmerman and Dyk 2000, I).

As evidence, despite massive amounts of

federal funding flowing to the region since the 1960' s and despite the longest
economic expansion in United States' history during the 1990's, one-fourth of
Appalachian counties are classified as economically distressed (Jones 2000).
While these statistics are certainly disheartening, the crux of the problem is
not that welfare spending has failed to end poverty. Even if it were possible to
increase the income of all impoverished individuals to a socially desirable level,
poverty will never be alleviated until people are self-supporting. Perhaps Howard
Baetjer Jr. expressed this idea best in the article "Does Welfare Diminish Poverty"
when he draws the analogy: "It is not enough that they be living for the moment at an ·
acceptable standard if they remain dependent, just as one is not cured of a disease
when he is taking medicine that eliminates his symptoms (Baetjer 1984)." Rather
than dull the pain experienced by individuals living with persistent poverty, it is
necessary to address the characteristics of Appalachia that have caused the region to
be left out of the economic expansions of recent decades.
A substantial amount of research corroborates these findings that welfare
encumbers progress against poverty in rural regions of persistent hardship (Baetjer
1984). A review of the literature in this area yields explanations that are numerous
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and intertwined. Most agree, however, that the following variables stand out as
significant obstacles for virtually every community: low rates of education, high
rates of single-parent families, lack of access to childcare, and lack of accessible
transportation.
While the trends in the region of Appalachia oflow educational attainment
rates and high birthrates of children to unwed, teenage mothers are social problems,
the remainder of challenging issues faced by the region can collectively termed as the
"friction of distance" by Zimmerman and Dyk in their article "The Impact and
Outcomes of Welfare Reform Across Rural and Urban Places in Kentucky" published
in 2000. This concept encompasses problems associated with low population
densities in rural areas such as extended travel time to work, school, childcare, and
healthcare, often over difficult landscapes.
This problem of living in remote locations is further complicated by a scarcity
of public transportation and low rates of private ownership of a reliable vehicle
(Zimmerman and Dyk 2000, 3). Thus, even if all welfare recipients adopted an
attitude of personal responsibility, there are massive interventions in the structural
characteristics of the region that must be addressed before an end to poverty in
Appalachia can be expected (Tickamyer et al. 2005, 20).
First, Appalachia has consistently low rates of educational attainment. Whether
a high school dropout resides in Appalachia or in another region of the United States,
it is statistically proven that the propensity for him or her to live in poverty is
increased by the decision not to obtain a full secondary education. Statistically, in
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2007, labor economists estimated that one additional year of high school translates
into a 10 percent average gain in earnings. Moreover, the attainment of a college
degree, on average, adds 20 to 30 percent in earning potential. These social scientists
hypothesize that it is not simply the acquisition of cognitive skills that increase
income, but the development of non-cognitive skills such as self-control,
responsibility, initiative, and charisma (Ziliak 2007, 2).
In Appalachia, the association between higher educational attainment and
higher earning potential is particularly strong. While some hypothesize that high
school dropouts make a rational choice not to pursue an education based on the
unavailability of quality jobs in the region, a 2005 study by Lichter and Campbell
finds little evidence that education does not pay in Appalachia.
Rather, poverty rates are not only very high among the least educated
Appalachians, but these rates are higher than the rates-among individuals with
comparable levels of education elsewhere in the country (Lichter & Campbell 2005,
29). Lichter and Campbell theorize that their results are not reflective of unique
benefits of education in rural Appalachia but that there are extremely high
consequences of low educational achievement among the poorest in this region
(Lichter & Campbell 2005, 23).
Despite the persuasive evidence supporting the recommendation for
Appalachian youth to stay in school, there is reason to believe that even the finest
education available to the region may be sub par. Because school systems are
financed through ad valorem taxes levied on properties in the school district, the low
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property values in the region of Appalachia do not generate a tax based that is able to
provide adequate funding for quality institutions and teachers (Appalachian Regional
Commission, 10).
Furthermore, it is a commonplace for those who receive a quality education to
migrate away from the Appalachian region in search of better economic
opportunities. While this may better the lives of those who leave, it leaves the
remainder of the Appalachian population less educated, unemployed, and
impoverished with little to attract industry to the region.
In 1997, Brian Cushing explained that, "the remaining people cannot
reasonably get to the jobs, and the jobs will not come to the people" (Cushing 1997,
2). Sadly, despite the region's increase in migration during the 1990's, much of the
growth due to an increase in the numbers of less educated individuals (Lichter &
Campbell 2005, 20-21 ). Specifically, between 1995 and 2000, about 25,000 more
college-educated persons left Appalachia than entered it (Lichter, Garratt, Marshall
and Cardella 2005). Appalachia migration over the years has lowered the average
educational level of the population and significantly reduced the number of collegeeducated individuals residing in the region. (Cushing 1997, 7).
Statistics suggest that the increasing disregard for the traditional family
structure has also played a large role in continuing and enlarging poverty in
Appalachia. The rise in single parent families, female-headed households in
particular, has been accompanied by an increase in poverty rates, especially among
children (Lichter and Crowley 2004; Iceland 2003). In the United States as a whole,

62

the 2000 census revealed that 34.3 percent of female-headed families with minor
children were poor (Lichter & Campbell 2005), and in Appalachia, the percent was 3
percent higher (Mather 2004, 30). This was the highest rate of any family structure,
especially in comparison to the low rates for families of couple families (Lichter &
Campbell 2005).
Perhaps the most devastating effect that the welfare policies have had on
Appalachia, and on poor regions throughout the country, is that the incentives
produced by anti-poverty programs seem to have encouraged this breakdown in the
traditional family structure. This theory is based on the facts that, for individuals on
welfare, to get married is also to face a reduction in benefits that represent, on
average, 10% to 20% of their total income (Brownback & Blankenhom 2008).
Scholars estimate that fear of this marriage penalty causes a larger number
of couples not to marry than the number who would experience a cutback in
benefits because of misunderstanding (Brownback & Blankenhom 2008). If this is
indeed the case, welfare policies effectively give incentives for poor couples to
avoid taking advantage of an institution that would likely lift them out of poverty
over time. The unity of marriage typically provides couples with the ability to build
financial stability and move off of welfare rolls (Brownback & Blankenhom 2008).
As disconcerting as the rise in single-parent households is, the tendency for
young women to become pregnant out of wedlock is equally, if not more, of a
problem for impoverished communities in Appalachia. Research has shown that the
presence of children is associated with higher poverty rates for families in this region
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(Mather 2004, 33). Many argue that young people continue to have children that they
can not afford because, with each new addition to the family, Section Eight Housing
payments rise; food stamps rise, and the welfare check increases in amount (Linehan
2009).
Young mothers who have never been married are especially prone to becoming
long-term welfare recipients. During the time span when AFDC payments were being
made, two-thirds of all mothers on welfare gave birth to at least one child while .she
was a teenager. These families were expected to spend ten or more years on welfare.
The longevity of this environment meant that children grew up in homes lacking
those ideas of personal responsibility, self-support, and work that form the foundation
of the successful American family (Rector & Butterfield 1987, 2). Thus, many
children born of young, unwed Appalachia mothers experienced negative outcomes
beyond financial disadvantages (Mather 2004, 30).
Another reason that being a single parent in Appalachia is particularly
difficult to overcome is that there is a scarcity of adequate and affordable childcare in
the Appalachian region. Many women cite this factor as a limitation in their ability to
join the labor force. Moreover, research has shown that this poor quality of care, in
terms of staff-to-child ratios, training, turnover rates, and staff salaries, can be yet
another negative in the cognitive development and language skills of children. As a
result, it is common in Appalachia for families to rely on informal childcare
arrangements with friends or relatives (Mather 2004, 21-23). In 2000, there were just
over 400,000 grandparents who reported living with their grandchildren and being
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responsible for providing care of their basic needs (18-19).
Although it is not the ideal solution to end poverty in Appalachia by
encouraging migration of individuals to regions with better economic opportunities,
studies show that this resolution is scarcely an option for Appalachian families.
Appalachia's distressed counties had the highest share of grandparents as caregivers,
56 percent, compared with other regions in the country (Mather 2004, 20). As a
result, many are unable to simply pick up and leave because they would risk losing
the childcare required for them to join the labor force (23).
In fact, this dependence has caused a number of low-income individuals who
choose to leave the Appalachian area to experience more difficult economic
challenges in new areas even when employment opportunities are more prevalent
there (Garkovich 1997). In short, the presence of children often makes it less feasible
for families to migrate where jobs are available, thus limiting the possibility that
individuals will be able to pull themselves out of poverty.
Although the problems of low rates of educational attainment, high rates of
unmarried teenage pregnancy, and, in turn, the limited mobility that results from
dependence on informal childcare arrangements, are avoidable outcomes of bad
decisions made by individuals, the problems of inadequate roadways in Appalachia is
not a factor of poverty that can be controlled independently of government assistance.
Although the responsibility of government to maintain and improve roadways is not
explicitly defined in the Constitution, even the strictest constructionists would agree
that this is a conservative role for the government to play in the nation's economy. It
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is only when the Appalachian communities are provided with adequate roadways that
they will be able to attract the manufacturing jobs required for the expansion of
economic opportunities. Manufacturing firms, in tum, add to retail success in the
area because of the high wages associated with industry compared to agriculture.
More importantly, elevated salaries from industry allow residents to pull themselves
out of long-term dependence on welfare income (Blair et al. 2004).
In light of this solution, one may question why the Appalachian region has not
experienced higher rates of poverty alleviation from the large investments that have
been made in the roadways of the region. After all, nearly two-thirds of the budget of
the Appalachian Regional Commission's budget goes towards the improvement of the
roads. Engineers explain, however, "by its hilly nature, Appalachia is expensive to
'fix'" (Jones 2000). For example, an eleven and a half mile stretch of U.S. 23 in
eastern Kentucky that required massive rock excavation cost $47 million. By
comparison, highways in flat, non-Appalachian western Kentucky run $2 million per
mile (Jones 2000).
As another example, by the year 2000, the Appalachian Regional Commission
had spent $5 billion toward a 3,000-mile system of highways that was nearly
complete. To complete the project, however, the last 700 miles were estimated to cost
more than the first 2,300 because what remained was to excavate the mountains
(Jones 2000).
When welfare initiatives were first put in place in the Appalachian region, the
funding for programs intentionally bypassed the control of local politicians in order to
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prevent corruption. Enraged by this circumvention, these leaders attempted to
persuade constituents that the true agenda of community volunteers and bureaucrats
was to promote Communism (Jones 2000). This allegation, combined with the
independent personality of many Appalachian mountaineers, caused many to decline
participation in welfare programs.
Other areas in Appalachia may have been bypassed all together. "Easier-toreach poor were reached more often and benefited more fully than those considered
'hard-core' poor" (Germany, 7). Counties that were considered "sinkholes.for
investment" were ignored for many of the early years of the War on Poverty, giving
these areas a late start and a lower overall chance of success. Many of the interior,
rural counties received no funding until the 1980's (Jones 2000).
With the passage of PRWORA in 1996, the devolution from the federal to the
state level of welfare funding was designed to correct these problems. The block
grants given to states make it more likely that funds are evenly distributed, as
opposed to a return on investment calculation done at the federal level. Moreover, the
state governments should be more adept at addressing the challenges that face
communities because of their proximity and their accountability to constituents
(Tickamyer et al. 2005, 7-8). With this in mind, 15 states have devolved
responsibility to local counties and communities. "Second-order devolution," as this
delegation is called, leads to heightened discretion for local governments and allows
greater flexibility in the types and delivery of services offered to families (Whitener
et al. 2002, 3).
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The challenge to this thinking, however, many claim that the most
disadvantaged areas in Appalachia are also those with the least local capacity. There
is a small probability that the political institutions in poor rural areas will be able to
implement programs that comply with federal mandates and that cater to the needs of
the local community (Tickamyer et al. 2005, 7-8). The wide variation in welfare
initiatives that results from this flexibility also makes it more difficult to assess the
holistic success of welfare (Whitener et al. 2002, 2).
More importantly, the theory oflocal discretion being favorable does not take
into consideration that structural issues of rural communities, which are a dominant
barrier to the success of welfare in Appalachian. Local leaders have the ability to
make individual interventions rather than structural changes (Tickamyer et al. 2005,
24). Directors are all too aware that they are dealing with a larger structural issue,
endemic to the region, but it is beyond their power to do anything at this level
(Tickamyer et al. 2005, 25).
The frontiersmen who traversed mountainous lands to settle in the unexplored ·
territory of Appalachia were independent and self-sufficient people (Williams 2002);
they were the very essence of Americans who believe that limited government can
offer unlimited opportunity through hard work and initiative (Arrney 2004). When the
poverty warriors arrived under the banner of the War on Poverty, however,
Appalachian people saw themselves reflected in the eyes of people who saw
something that needed to be corrected (Jones 2000).
Having now been geographically isolated and welfare dependent for
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generations, Appalachians must re-experience the self-reliance and the love of liberty
those early settlers shared. When the people ofthis region are able to make the
primary drive for change, welfare reform will be successful (Appalachian Regional
Commission, 8). More specifically, the Appalachian people must break the spirit of
poverty and dependency that government transfer payments create (Armey 2004).

Suggestions for Improvements to Welfare
Having traced the development of the welfare system in the United States and
having uncovered the mal-incentives and inherent challenges involved in reforming
the entitlement programs, the only reasonable perspective from which to
recommended any changes to the American welfare state is one that takes into
account the difficulty of the task and the great opposition that would be faced.
Reforms, therefore, must be submitted slowly, yet deliberately. Most importantly, in
an effort to implement a more conservative interpretation of the Constitution,
modifications that dismantle the entitlement system in America must occur
incrementally, as did the steps that led to its enormity.
Specifically, as opposed to advocating the termination of certain welfare
initiatives, change would be more easily achieved by working with supporters of
welfare to make marginal enhancements to the EITC. The EITC has, at least, some
positive effects on the number of hours worked by low-income individuals, and it has
helped individuals improve their economic situation.
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In fact, this program is widely considered to be the most efficient social
welfare policy adopted by Congress. According to a survey conducted by the
Employment Policies Institute in 2007, fifty-three percent oflabor economists believe
that the EITC is very efficient while only twelve percent of the same survey group
perceive general welfare grants as efficient (Employment Policies Institute). In
addition to this support for the theoretical underpinning of the EITC, there have been
a number of census reports that support the notion that millions of Americans are
removed from poverty because of the assistance they receive through the EITC (Eissa
and Nichols, 90).
Because eligibility of the EITC is limited to families with earned income from
work, researchers acknowledge that the credit provides incentives for transitioning
from welfare to work and has dramatic effects on the labor force participation for
low-income individuals (Levitis and Koulish, 2008a). Having an incentive to work
not only helps improve an individual's economic situation, but it provides the
psychological benefit of not having to rely on govermnent handouts to survive (Peters
2007).
In this regard, Nobel Prize winning economist Milton Friedman, mentioned
earlier, touts five advantages to a general negative income tax: 1.) the negative
income tax has the advantage of providing economic relief to poor families solely on
the basis of their income, and not on the basis of other classifying characteristics that
were used historically to represent a need for assistance; 2.) the negative income tax
provides the recipient with cash, the "best" form of support; 3.) a negative income tax
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could replace a number of other programs designed to improve income inequality; 4.)
a negative income tax saves administrative costs; 5.) and negative income taxes do
not interfere with the function of the free market, as do other initiatives such as
minimum wage law and tariffs (Moffitt 2003, 128).
Advocates of Friedman's paradigm of minimal government claim that these
benefits are not fully realized through the current EITC design, however. These
followers purport that the fight to improve the economic situation oflow-income
workers could be better won if the EITC policy was modified to reflect more of
Friedman's ideas (Moffitt 2003).
As it functions now, the EITC is refundable, meaning that it has the potential
to reduce tax owed to below zero, with any negative amount being paid to the
individual as a transfer payment from the government. Because most low-income
workers owe little or no federal income taxes, the EITC simply provides cash benefits
to eligible recipients. The dollar amount by which the EITC reduces a workers tax
obligation is not a fixed number, however.
To ensure that the EITC program is equitable and an appropriate use of public
funds, the government has determined eligibility thresholds and limitations.
Specifically, the amount of the EITC is determined in a formula that takes into
account the income and family structure of each individual worker (Holt, 2006): The
low rate, 7 .65 percent of qualified earned income, is paid to taxpayers with no
children; a much higher rate, 34 percent of qualified earned income, is paid to
taxpayers with one child; and an even higher rate, 40 percent of qualified earned
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income, is paid to taxpayers with two or more children (Marguerite Casey
Foundation). For 2008, families with two or more children receive an EITC equal to
40 cents for each dollar of qualified earned income up to $12,060, for a maximum
benefit of $4,824. Families with one child receive an EITC equal to 34 cents for each
dollar earned up to $8,580, for a maximum benefit of$2,917. Families continue to be
eligible for the maximum credit until their income reaches $15,740 (or $18,740 for
married-couple families) (Levitis and Koulish, 2008).
There is a phase-out range for each family structure (Marguerite Casey
Foundation). Specifically, the EITC phases out gradually as income rises above
$15,740 for single-parent families or $18,740 for married couples (Levitis and
Kou!ish, 2008). Single-parent families with two or more children remain eligible for
some EITC benefit until income exceeds $38,646, while such families with one child
remain eligible for some EITC benefit until income exceeds $33,995. For married
couples, the maximum eligibility levels are $41,646 for two or more children and
$36,995 for one child.
The following charts reflect the eligibility thresholds and limitations for the
year 2009:
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The Federal Earned Income Tax Credit in Tax Year 2009
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Congress has determined that a subtle decrease in the amount of the EITC is
necessary because its benefits extend to taxpayers earning levels of income that are
much higher than those typically assisted through social welfare programs (Moffitt,
2003). Overall, the complex structure of the program attempts efficiently to create
and equitably to administer incentives for workers to recognize there is more income
potential to be gained fro m working than there is to be derived from receiving welfare
(Webster and Weeks, 1995).
Because the EITC is a program with a substantial impact on worker
incentives, as well as the economy as a whole, it is reasonab le that there is a plethora
of empirical economic research aimed at mathematically evaluating the policy and, in
tum, a number of studies that shed light on areas in need of improvement. For
example, in "The EITC Disincentive: The Effects on Hours Worked from the Phaseout of the Earned Income Tax Credit," Paul Trampe uses economic regression models
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to express his point of view that the phase-out portion of the EITC schedule needs
substantial revision. This article sheds light on one undeniable drawback in the EITC
program that is, workers have a disincentive to work past the point that their income
stops being subsidized by the government (Trampe 2007).
Like Trampe, Jeffery Liebman, in his article "The Optimal Design of the
Earned Income Tax Credit," notes some aspects ofEITC policies that suggest reform
is necessary. Liebman also uses economic regressions to assert a less than ideal
perspective of the effectiveness of the EITC as it stands today (Liebman 2001). He
claims that the overall efficiency of redistributing income through the EITC is fairly
low because leakages that exist in the process.
In general, as explained above that a massive amount of funding is directed
away from poverty alleviation towards bureaucratic budgets, Liebman explains that
there is substantial deadweight loss from the transfers. Specifically, Liebman's study
finds that in 2001 it cost upper income taxpayers $1.88 to provide a transfer worth
$1.00 to EITC recipients. Leibman also develops scenarios to illustrate labor supply
choices and analyzes the optimal design of the EITC in the context of a simple static
labor supply model (Liebman 2001).
Some of the criticisms from these scholars might be explained by the
comment in a report by the Marguerite Casey Foundation: "Although the EITC has
developed into a major program providing significant benefits for millions of working
families, it has expanded ad-hoc ... " (Marguerite Casey Foundation 2005, 5). This
unplanned evolution of the policy also caused Professor Lawrence Zelenak to assert,
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"Congress has never offered a coherent account of the purpose (or purposes) of the
EITC, and the structure of current law does not suggest any well-defined purpose"
(Marguerite Casey Foundation 2005, 5). The following recommendations include the
past and current ideas purported to correct any faults of the policy that came about
because of this lack of initial planning.
As policymakers have debated each welfare reform since 1935, it has been
recognized that the signals provided to low-income individuals through public
policies can substantially influence the social scene of the country. For example, in
his article, "The Negative Income Tax and the Evolution of U.S. Welfare Policy,"
Robert Moffit notes that, "theoretical literature on models of family structure
generally supports the commonsense proposition that offering benefits only to one
family type will increase the number of families of that type" (Moffitt 2003, 130).
Taking this concept into consideration, the most recent welfare reforms have worked
to align incentives provided by the EITC and other initiatives with the broad
macroeconomic and social goals of the country. For example, recent modifications
have made it so that the low-income workers who do not have children have recently
become eligible for EITC cash assistance. This reduces the tendency for young
women to have children outside of marriage just to receive the EITC. Better still, the
recent reduction of the marriage penalty makes it less likely that single mothers will
choose to avoid marriage marry in order to continue receiving welfare benefits
(Moffitt 2003, 130).
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Even after recent reforms, many legislators feel that current provisions for
childless workers, the maximum set at $438 in 2008, is too small (Aron-Dine and
Sherman). Policy makers who feel that it creates inappropriate incentives to have
such a major difference between this cash assistance and the amount that is available
if the worker has a child would like to see the benefits for childless workers
expanded. Because of the incremental path of development that the EITC has
followed to this point, and in light of the relatively minor expense that would be
added through a policy reform to address this concern, it seems likely that the cash
assistance for childless workers will be further increased in the future.
Another proposal that is being debated in terms of the incentives that are
created by government policies is limiting the number of years that an individual may
claim the EITC benefits. This proposal was considered and subsequently
implemented by the Personal Responsibility & Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996 for general welfare policies. The current call for reform of the EITC is based
on the arguments made by economists that, in the phase-out portion of the benefits
schedule, workers have an incentive to reduce the number of hours they work in order
to claim a higher amount of EITC cash assistance. Empirical· evidence shows that
low-income workers are aware of this flaw in the design and take advantage of the
opportunity when they are able. In response, in 2003, Congresswoman Sue Myrick
and Congressman Ernest Istook wrote a letter to the Republican leadership of the
House of Representatives. The text of the letter suggested implementing time limits
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for eligibility to receive benefits through the E ITC, in o rder to remove the potential
for abuse of the ErTC program (Marguerite Casey Foundation 2005, 8).
One central feature of the ElTC since its inception is " work requirements:' A
system that is organized with this structure requires the government to divide the
population into those who can and cannot reasonably be expected to work. Once
classified, those deemed "employable" are the only persons eli gible for E lTC
benefits, assuming that they choose to work some minimum number of hours
(Moffitt 2003, 131 ). The thinking behind the E ITC takes this concept one step further
to assert that individuals who are "employable," are also wi lling and able to work
more hours. as this is the only means by which an individual can increase the tax
credit that he or she receives.
Although the work requirement feature of the EITC has caused the policy to
receive wide support, the large number of categories that are currently used in
determining specific dollar amounts per worker requires implementation by a large
bureaucratic organizati on. As a result, the expenditure per recipient is quite
substantial. Moreover, although thi s was the o utcome that the negati ve income tax
proposed by Milton Friedman was des igned to avoid, the current implementation of
the E ITC requires the government to be hi ghly involved in regulating the lives o r
welfare recipients. Although a refo m1 to implement a Friedman-style negative
income tax would be inconsistent with the incremental ism path of development that
the EITC has taken, it would greatly reduce the administrative cost of the welfare
system.
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Even if implementation of a true negative income tax could not be achieved,
many policy analysts assert that the EITC could be effectively combined with other
tax credits. Not only would this practice serve to reduce the burden imposed on
bureaucratic agencies, the process of claiming multiple credits would be simplified.
Because of the emphasis placed on the family structure in the administration of the
EITC benefits, taxpayers who qualify for the EITC often qualify for the Child Credit
and the Dependent Care Credit. This commonality makes it logical to combine these
policy initiatives into a single Family Tax Credit, for example (Marguerite Casey
Foundation 2005, 11).

One other way to reduce the bureaucratic effort required to administer the EITC
would be the expanded partnership with community development organizations. The
employees and volunteers of these organizations are excellent references for
understanding the effectiveness of the EITC, identifying obstacles or inefficiencies of
implementation, and determining how average citizens perceive the policy. Their
frequent contact with recipients of welfare programs helps develop trust and
credibility in the low-income community that is crucial in establishing a relationship
and effectively increasing awareness about the EITC.
To be more specific, numerous community development organizations have
expanded the types of services they offer to include free or discounted tax preparation
assistance, check cashing services, and free bank accounts that enable low-income
taxpayers to receive their refunds quickly through direct deposit (Marguerite Casey
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Foundation 2005). In the absence of these free services, low-income individuals
often find it necessary to use a for-profit tax preparer, which results in a dramatic
reduction in dollar amount of benefits that they receive.
More importantly, community development organizations can help EITC
beneficiaries avoid falling prey to the predatory lending associated with refund
anticipation loans. These loans provide advances on the borrower's anticipated
refund in return for outlandish interest rates. Not only are community development
organizations well equipped to provide personalized and high quality assistance to
those in poverty, the more they are encouraged to do, the less assistance is required
from the government, thereby making great strides towards decentralizing entitlement
programs.
Through incremental improvements to the policy, the EITC has gained
popularity to a degree that it is now called a "critical tool for making low-skill work
pay" (Aron-Dine and Arloc Sherman). In light of the bipartisan support that the EITC
enjoys, it would serve as the best starting place from which to begin a reform of the
welfare system with the ultimate goal of bringing this aspect of American government
back towards the original intent of the founding fathers.

Conclusion
In sum, even though the foundation of American society is known to have
produce rags-to-riches narratives, the brief history of the United States has seen
repeated public cries for government to help equalize the economic conditions under
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which all citizens live. At the very least, Americans want government to ensure that
all who need assistance remain at a politically acceptable level of poverty. Despite
what may have been good intentions with the development of the entitlement system
in the United States, government transfers of wealth never had the ability to solve the
problem of poverty. Welfare programs will always, as evidenced in Appalachia,
subsidize poor decisions and trap generations of recipients into vicious cycles of
dependence (Armey 2004). Over thirty years ago, President Jimmy Carter explained,
"the welfare system is anti-work, anti-family, inequitable in its treatment of the poor
and wasteful of the taxpayers' dollars" (Rector 2001). Even with this knowledge, the ·
United States policy makers continue to enlarge the number of welfare recipients and
the benefits that they receive on a yearly basis (Rector 2001 ).
Despite the assumption of power by the centralized government to direct
economic affairs, Washington has failed to provide for the general welfare. Perhaps
the nation's initiatives would have achieved greater success if they had been focused
on the promotion as opposed to the provision of welfare for American citizens, as
would be compliant with the role of government as outlined in the Preamble of the
Constitution.
This loss should be attributed to the flawed battle plan designed by Presidents
Roosevelt, Kennedy and Johnson. Instead of focusing on what the government can
do for people by means of handouts, "poverty can be defeated by fighting it with
freedom" (Armey 2004). A return to the fundamental principals of the American
founding would allow for this victory. Just as there were incremental changes that
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took place to lead the American society towards one of more centralized planning
than the founding fathers intended, so too must there be incremental changes to return
America to the fundamental principles of economic freedom and personal liberty.
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